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PREVIEW; Kaul v. State Farm: “From the roof tear to the wall, 
when a policy can’t cover it all” Does the Doctrine of Efficient 




Oral Argument is scheduled for Wednesday, January 6, 2021, at 9:30 
a.m., and will be conducted telephonically. Lincoln Palmer and Rexford 
L. Palmer will likely appear for the Appellants, Gary and Carolyn Kaul, 
and Bradley Luck and Katelyn Hepburn will likely appear for the 
Appellee, State Farm. The Appellants have allotted five minutes of their 
time for Amicus Curiae arguments from the Montana Trial Lawyers 




This case presents questions about insurance coverage in Montana. 
The Court will decide whether Montana’s “efficient proximate cause 
doctrine” mandates coverage for water damage to a recreational vehicle’s 
(“RV”) wall, and whether the wall repair is covered as a mitigation 
expense, assuming the repair was necessary to protect the RV from 
additional damage. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Gary and Carolyn Kaul were driving their RV in March 2017, when 
the vehicle’s roof membrane was torn by a tree.1 Later, while the RV was 
in storage in Missoula, rain got in through the tear, damaging the RV’s 
wall.2 The Kauls noticed this damage in May and June.3 State Farm paid 
for the roof’s repair, but denied coverage for the wall repair and the related 
expenses.4 The Kauls sued to obtain coverage, alleging State Farm should 
have covered all the expenses and repair costs along with the roof repair.5 
The Kauls moved for summary judgment on the issue of coverage of 
the wall damage to their RV and the expenses they incurred to protect the 
RV from further damage.6 State Farm cross-moved for summary 
judgment, alleging the clear and unambiguous language of the State Farm 
Recreational Vehicle Policy (“Policy”) precludes coverage for the wall 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, Class of 2021. 
1 Brief for Appellant at 2, Kaul v. State Farm, https://perma.cc/M32P-LZAG (Mont. May 16, 2020) 
(No. DA 20-0052) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. 
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 4.  
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 9. 
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damage.7 State Farm prevailed on summary judgment as to the wall 
damage,8 but the Kauls prevailed as to their expenses.9  
The district court concluded the Policy’s definition of loss as “direct, 
sudden, and accidental damage” is unambiguous; the damage must be all 
three, not just “direct.”10 Thus, the court found the proximate cause 
analysis was not proper, because this doctrine does not account for the 
Policy’s language.11 The court found there was no genuine issue of 
material fact regarding water damage to the RV wall12 and concluded the 
water damage to the wall was not a covered loss under the policy, because 
it did not result from sudden damage. Thus, partial summary judgment was 
granted in favor of State Farm.13 The district court found State Farm must 
pay any reasonable expenses incurred to protect the RV from additional 
damage.14 Excluding the expenses arising directly from the repair to the 
RV wall, this award was calculated to be $3,177.00.15 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellant Kaul’s Argument 
 
Appellant’s arguments on appeal are: (1) Montana’s “efficient 
proximate cause doctrine” mandates coverage of the water damage to the 
RV wall; (2) 34 minutes of water entry into the RV wall constitutes 
“sudden damage” because the RV required repair; and (3) the wall repair 
is covered as a mitigation expense because expert testimony states it was 
necessary to protect the RV from additional damage.16 Appellant states 
how Green v. Milwaukee Mechanics’ Ins. Co.17 introduced the doctrine of 
efficient proximate cause, thus mandating coverage of subsequent loss 
proximately caused by a covered loss.18 This doctrine is sometimes applied 
when the subsequent loss is not covered.19 
Appellants explain Appellee conceded coverage of the roof tear, and 
how the roof tear proximately caused the wall damage.20 They argue 
Montana's efficient proximate cause doctrine mandates coverage of the 
 
7 Brief for Appellee at 8, Kaul v. State Farm, https://perma.cc/K6DE-NW7D (Mont. Aug. 5, 2020) 
(No. DA 20-0052) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 10. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 15. 
14 Id. at 22. 
15 Id.  
16 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 6–7.  
17 252 P. 310 (1926). 
18 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Green, 252 P. at 314).  
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 13.  
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wall repair because the roof tear proximately caused the wall damage.21 
Appellant also maintains that if a court applies a reasonable interpretation 
of “damage” as “loss of value” or “need to repair” to the Policy, the water 
entering the RV was sudden damage and thus should be covered.22 
Appellant contends the Policy requires the insureds to protect the RV 
from additional damage, and in turn, requires State Farm to pay for such 
mitigation.23 Appellant’s expert testified that after the roof tore and 
allowed water entry, it was necessary to repair the wall to protect the RV 
from additional damage.24 Appellant argues the district court erred by 
declining to judicially notice Appellant’s weather data because the data 
proves the damage was sudden, since it highlights how more than two 
gallons of rain entered the RV wall in 34 minutes.25 
In summation, Appellant argues the Court should reverse the entry of 
summary judgment against him, because the efficient proximate cause 
doctrine applies to the Policy even though it requires the damage or loss 
to be “sudden.” Next, Appellant states the Court should hold the wall 
damage is a covered loss because the water entry qualifies as sudden 
damage when reasonably defined. Finally, Appellant argues the Court 
should hold the Policy’s mitigation clause required him to remove and 
repair the wall to protect the RV from additional damage, and thus requires 
State Farm to pay for the removal and repair. 
 
B. Appellee State Farm’s Argument 
 
Appellee argues Montana’s efficient proximate cause doctrine does 
not mandate coverage under the Kauls’ circumstances, and the 
unambiguous Policy terms at issue do not provide coverage for the RV 
damage, nor the costs of mitigation.26 Appellee argues Appellant’s use of 
Green and Park Saddle Horse Co. v. Royal Indemnity Company,27 which 
found coverage as a result of efficient proximate cause, is inappropriate 
because the rulings are narrow.28 According to Appellee, in those cases, 
the subsequent losses at issue fell within coverage—if the loss was 
excluded, the doctrine was applied to overcome an applicable exclusion 
because it was not superseding specific policy language.29 Appellee also 
argues that Appellant’s mitigation argument should be waived because he 
failed to raise it at the district court level.30 
 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 22.  
23 Id. at 29. 
24 Id. at 31.  
25 Id. at 22. 
26 Brief for Appellee, supra note 7, at 1.  
27 Park Saddle Horse Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 261 P. 880 (1927). 
28 Brief for Appellee, supra note 7, at 12–13. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 37. 
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Appellee argues the Policy is unambiguous, and the proximate cause 
doctrine cannot be used to rewrite unambiguous policy language or to 
ignore key terms in favor of coverage.31 Appellee contends the district 
court’s holding balances contract law with Park Saddle and Green,32 and 
reversing its holding will have the effect of rewriting the Kauls’ Policy.33 
According to Appellee, the Court has held the efficient proximate cause 
doctrine may apply to broaden the interpretation of a policy but cannot 
ignore clear and unambiguous policy language.34  
Appellee also challenges Amicus’s argument advocating for 
adoption of a limitless efficient proximate cause doctrine.35 Appellee 
argues the undisputed grant of coverage in the Policy is clear and 
unambiguous, and a limitless application of the efficient proximate cause 
doctrine is not supported by Montana law, nor consistent with public 
policy.36 
Appellee maintains the district court’s holding was correct because 
the Policy’s terms are unambiguous.37 Appellee claims the damage to the 
RV wall is not a covered loss, because it is not sudden damage, and instead 
apprises the Court to reject Appellant’s interpretation of the Policy. 
Courts, Appellee contends, “may not rewrite the contract at issue, but must 
enforce it as written if its language is clear and explicit.”38  
 
C. Amicus MTLA’s Argument 
 
The Montana Trial Lawyers Association (“MTLA”) argues the Court 
should re-endorse and clarify the efficient proximate cause doctrine.39 
MTLA states that the efficient proximate cause doctrine is good law, and 
insurance consumers in Montana should be granted coverage for all 
proximately caused insured risks.40 MTLA asserts the doctrine complies 
with Montana law, public policy, and the “reasonable expectations of 
coverage” doctrine.41 This doctrine requires objectively reasonable 
expectations of policy holders be honored even if minutiae of certain 
policy provisions would have negated those expectations.42 MTLA 
maintains the efficient proximate cause doctrine provides insureds with 
what a reasonable person would expect from an insurance policy.43 MTLA 
 
31 Id. at 15. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 22. 
34 Id. at 24. 
35 Id. at 3. 
36 Id. at 22. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 23.  
39 Brief for Amicus Curiae at 3, Kaul v. State Farm, https://perma.cc/RT43-RV27 (Mont. May 16, 
2020) (No. DA 20-0052). 
40 Id. at 17 (citing Villella v. Pub. Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 725 P.2d 957, 961 (Wash. 1986)). 
41 Id. (citing Frontline Processing Corp. v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 149 P.3d 906, 911 (2006)).  
42 Id. (citing Meadow Brook, LLP v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., P.3d 608, 611 (2014)).  
43 Id.  
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contends an ordinary consumer would not expect to have coverage on such 
things as tree and hail damage, but not on consequential damages, such as 
the water infiltration here. MTLA argues the Court should expand the 





The main issue here is whether the RV’s wall damage is a covered 
loss. In the past, the Court has narrowly ruled on efficient proximate cause 
and has never let the doctrine override unambiguous policy language. The 
outcome could change coverage law in Montana.  
It is longstanding Montana law that damages proximately caused by 
a covered loss are covered under an insurance policy.45 Any ambiguity in 
a policy must “be interpreted most strongly in favor of the insured and any 
doubts as to coverage are to be resolved in favor of extending coverage.”46 
Given the protective purpose of insurance, exclusions are to be “narrowly 
and strictly construed.”47 Yet, in Montana, a court’s interpretation of an 
insurance policy is a question of law.48 Courts are required to interpret the 
policy’s terms according to their usual, common sense meaning, from the 
perspective of a reasonable consumer of insurance products.49 The general 
rule is to interpret any doubts as to coverage in favor of the insured, unless 
the policy language is clear and unambiguous.50  
In Park Saddle, a rancher was insured against direct loss surrounding 
saddle horses, and a ranch guest fell while hiking near their horse.51 The 
Park Saddle Court stated: 
In determining the cause of loss for the purpose of fixing the insured’s 
liability, when concurring causes of the damage appear, the proximate 
cause to which the loss is to be attributed is the dominant, the efficient, 
one that sets other causes in operation, and causes which are incidental 
are not proximate, though they may be nearest in time and place to the 
loss.52 
In Green, the Court analyzed whether coverage existed for fire 
damage and subsequent explosions under a policy insuring “against all 
direct loss or damage by fire,” but exempting damage from explosions 
unless a fire had happened first.53 The Court found the policy’s language 
specifying no explosion coverage “unless fire ensues” granted coverage of 
 
44 Id. at 18. 
45 Green, 252 P. at 311; Park Saddle, 261 P. at 884.  
46 247 P.3d 236, 239 (2010).  
47 Id.  
48 Counterpoint, Inc. v. Essex Ins. Co., 967 P.2d 393, 395 (1998).  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Green, 252 at 311. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
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the explosion.54 The Court decided that because the fire caused the 
explosion, and the policy exception noted explosions caused by fire were 
not exempted from coverage, the doctrine of efficient proximate cause 
granted coverage of the explosion damage. 
Here, the Policy’s unambiguous language covers losses that resulted 
from direct, sudden, and accidental damage.55 If the Policy’s loss were 
defined as direct loss, coverage would be proper under this doctrine 
because the roof tear eventually caused the wall damage.56 That said, 
unlike Green and Park Saddle, “loss” in the Policy is narrowly defined. 
Under Montana law, there would have to be a loss as defined by the Policy 
for Appellant’s wall damage to be covered.57 While the roof tear is a but-
for cause of the damage to the RV wall, the wall damage is likely not a 
covered loss because the Kauls cannot prove the damage was sudden.  
 The Court will likely reject Appellant’s argument that the rain 
damage was sudden, because, by definition, damage cannot be both 
sudden and gradual over multiple weeks. Appellant concedes the roof tear 
happened in March or April, but a bubble was not noticed until May.58 
Appellant continues to rely on NOAA evidence stating more than two 
gallons of rain entered the wall in 34 minutes. That said, this statistic 
addresses the amount of rainfall, not the immediacy of the water damage. 
The district court rejected this argument because it presupposes the wall 
damage was caused at the time of the rain, specifically on April 20. For 
these reasons, the Court’s analysis concerning the nature of the rain 
damage will likely fall in favor of Appellees. 
As explained in Montana Precedent, the Policy’s terms must be 
interpreted according to their common sense meaning, from the 
perspective of a reasonable consumer, and enforced as written when clear 
and unambiguous.59 For the doctrine of efficient proximate cause to 
mandate the wall’s coverage, the Court would have to overturn the district 
court’s ruling that the Policy’s language is unambiguous and precludes 
coverage. Unlike Green and Park Saddle, the issue here turns on whether 
the damage from water infiltration was sudden as a matter of law. In Kaul, 
the Court should determine whether the policy’s language precludes 
coverage or if a policy’s coverage can be extended by the doctrine of 
efficient proximate cause.60 The Court will likely uphold the district 
court’s plain meanings of “damage,” “loss,” and “sudden,” which will 
most likely determine the policy language precludes coverage of the wall 
damage.  
 
54 Id.  
55 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 2. 
56 Green, 252 P. at 311. 
57 Counterpoint, Inc., 967 P.2d at 395. 
58 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.  
59 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 28; Counterpoint, Inc., 967 P.2d at 395. 
60 Id.; Park Saddle 261 P. at 884. 
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Appellant states the district court’s decision was wrong because it 
said the Policy’s language was clear and unambiguous, thus a narrowly 
construed legal doctrine could not be applied. Appellant’s unique gradual 
damage situation and Policy are probably not similar enough to fall under 
the precedent set in Green and Park Saddle. If the Court ruled for the 
Appellant, it would set a precedent which may call into question segments 
of common policy language under various insurance policies when 
unexpected, uncovered losses could be proximately caused by a covered 
loss. The Court will likely uphold the ruling that the wall damage was not 




 State Farm originally covered the roof tear and some mitigation 
expenses the Kauls incurred to abide by their policy. The Court will likely 
uphold the district court’s findings that, when interpreted in a common 
sense meaning, the Policy’s language is clear and unambiguous. The Court 
will likely follow the precedent set in Montana and maintain the doctrine 
of efficient proximate cause cannot negate specific policy language. The 
Court will also likely uphold the district court’s ruling that the policy 
requires State Farm to pay Kaul for reasonable expenses incurred to 
protect the RV from additional damage, excluding the costs directly 
related to the repair of the RV wall.  
 
